Chapter 3. The altered world of dementia
We know that the person with dementia is unlikely to remember things in the way that they used to, or to be able to concentrate well; that language and comprehension may become muddled, and so on. This is the outward evidence of that with which we are all too familiar; but is there any way of exploring how the world is changing for that person, how it might be viewed from their point of view? We think that there is. There is of course much scope for improving our understanding, but we have found a fairly simple analogy to be a helpful starting point.
There has been considerable support over the years for the notion that the cognitive losses of dementia reflect (in a reverse direction) the cognitive gains of childhood; and a name that crops up repeatedly in the literature is that of the Swiss psychologist Piaget. Numerous commentators have found in Piaget’s intricate theory of cognitive development, a mirroring of dementia’s cognitive decline.
From the psychology literature, the work of de Ajuriaguerra et al (1964), using Piagetian tests on elderly people who have dementia, was the first to make such a link: ‘we have found in our patients all the stages of childhood described by Piaget’. More recently, Reisberg’s (1986) diagnostic ‘staging’ tool for Alzheimer’s disease (FAST) supports their hypothesis that deficits in dementia represent a reversal of Piaget’s developmental stages. The experiments of Stuart-Hamilton & McDonald (1996) using Piagetian tasks with unimpaired subjects, strengthen such a hypothesis. Most of this literature has been concerned with functional assessment alone, and indeed, a number of attempts have been made to construct assessment instruments based on a Piagetian hierarchy (McCurren and Ganong, 1984, Cole and Dastoor, 1987 and Sclan et al., 1990).
Piaget has also influenced the occupational therapy literature, though in considerably smaller measure. Würsten (1974) suggested that a Piagetian model of development had much to offer the concept of adaptation in occupational therapy. Unfortunately, he omitted to say how. Landsmann & Katz (1988) attempted to apply a Piagetian framework of assessment tests to psychiatric patients, but failed to offer a rationale for their assumption that developmental regression is at the root of mental illness. Both of these theories appear to have disappeared without trace in subsequent literature.
A much weightier contribution to professional advancement has been Mosey’s (1986) developmental frame of reference for occupational therapy, which is underpinned in some measure by Piagetian theory in its sequential linking of skills to stages of chronological development. Rather like Reisberg’s FAST instrument, it is designed to ‘stage’ an individual at a certain level of development and functional ability. Unlike the FAST, it is neither age- nor condition-specific, and is proposed for the field of mental health generally, to act as an indicator of functional level and as a guide for the appropriate delivery of therapy.
Also using Piaget as a base theory is the cognitive disability model of Allen (1985), whose six levels of cognitive ability are influenced by Piagetian concepts. This model was designed for occupational therapy with all cognitive disabilities, and this necessarily includes dementia, though Conroy’s (1996) evaluation of the model found the cognitive levels poorly articulated, and the model as a whole of limited utility in severe dementia.
A common thread running throughout this selection of literature is its primary concern with function and the assessment of function; it all appears to be driven by the question, ‘At what level of function is this impaired person now operating?’. We can make use of this material for assessment purposes if we wish, but we feel that it is actually more useful as an exploratory tool. That is how we shall use it in this chapter.
What appears to have been largely neglected in the body of literature surrounding Piaget’s work, is a study of the activity context in which his children developed their functional abilities, and the notion that such activity might actually be used in the context of therapeutic practice. A question which appears not to have been asked is, ‘If a person is at a given level of functioning, how might therapy be organised to accommodate that person?’. Chapter 8 looks specifically at this question.
Piaget was a prolific writer, with a very complex style, and in order to distil the key features of his theory, we have attempted a summary of his principal contentions. He categorised cognitive development in the child into four main stages (reflex, sensorimotor, representational, reflective), covering the ages 0–15. Each stage is again subdivided to demonstrate the progressive acquisition of cognitive skills as far as the individual’s mid-teens, at which point development is conceived to be complete. The following list is presented in reverse order to that set out by Piaget, i.e. 15 years (development complete) to 0 years (undeveloped), in order to offer a picture of cognitive decline as it might be viewed in dementia.
▪ Operations initiated in cooperation with others.
▪ Hypothetico-deductive reasoning – a problem is considered in terms of all possible relations that could hold true. All hypotheses are confirmed or rejected via experimentation.
▪ Propositional thinking – the ability to manipulate raw data into organised statements/propositions.
▪ Interpropositional thinking – the ability to develop logical relationships between propositions.
▪ Simplifying rules are devised to facilitate solutions to problems.
▪ Reflective thought is developed, and thought relating to future events is well articulated.
Concrete Operational (7–11 years) – mastery of classes, relations, numbers
▪ Operations characterised by a decrease in egocentricity from former stages, and an increase in cooperation.
▪ Mobility of thinking:
– ability to deploy reversibility (to consider a series of reverse operations that will restore an original situation)
– ability to decentre (to appreciate more than one stimulus at a time)
– ability to take another’s role
– ability to conceptualise class relations.
▪ Ability to utilise relational terms – e.g. bigger/darker.
▪ Seriation – ability to arrange objects in terms of weight, size, etc.
▪ Mental representation of seriation (ability to take overall view of whole series of actions taken to complete a task, e.g. a mental picture of each stage of the route to school).
Preoperational–Intuitive (4–7 years)–mastery of symbol
▪ Rudimentary concept of class (based on perceptual similarity, not logic, e.g. a starfish might be classed as a rock).
▪ Irreversibility of thought – see above.
▪ Inability to acknowledge conservation (that quantities of liquid/mass remain invariant in the face of perceptual transformation – e.g. a pint of water in a long tall glass is perceived to be greater in volume than a pint in a short fat glass).
▪ Lack of direction in thinking (unrelated explanations of the causes of an event juxtaposed).
▪ Egocentric thinking – human qualities attributed to natural phenomena.
▪ Difficulty in understanding simple relations, particularly in regard to self – e.g. bigger/smaller, left/right.
Preoperational – Preconceptual (2–4 years) – genesis of conceptual thought
▪ Linguistic development and ability to construct symbols (enabling past experience to be applied to present events).
▪ Syncretism (tendency to group unrelated events or items into a whole – e.g. woman, cookies, clock, matches = kitchen).
▪ Centring (ability to focus on only one aspect of a stimulus array at a time – others overlooked).
▪ World events perceived to have been caused by people (e.g. daylight caused by switching the light on).
Sensorimotor (0–2 years) – mastery of concrete objects
▪ Internal experimentation (18 months to 2 years). Utilisation of mental symbols to refer to objects absent from the immediate environment. Solutions to problems considered in a mental dimension rather than a physical (e.g. object will be sought where it last disappeared from view, rather than where it was last hidden).
▪ Tertiary circular reactions (1 year to 18 months). Object permanence established. Exploration of objects/events by trial and error experimentation. Interest in novel variation and how that variation affects objects or ability to obtain objects (e.g. toy under a pillow will be obtained by indirect measures such as kicking the pillow or displacing it with a stick).
▪ Secondary reactions (8 to 12 months). Means/ends clearly differentiated. Simple problem-solving. Beginnings of object permanence (a toy under a pillow continues to exist and will be sought; it is not ‘out-of-sight-out-of-mind’ as in the earlier stage).
▪ Secondary circular reactions (4 to 8 months). Manipulation of events/objects in the external environment; repetitive as in earlier stage, but now because of the interesting stimulus effects of the activity (e.g. arm-waving to move a toy suspended over a pram).
▪ Primary circular reactions (0 to 4 months). Non-intentional spontaneous actions centring on the body (thumb-sucking/blanket plucking), repeated for their own sake.
▪ Reflex (0 to 1 month). Externally evoked or self-initiated (sucking, grasping). Sympathetic crying.
Before proceeding, it should perhaps be noted that in the years since Piaget published his findings, there has been an extensive and vigorous debate on their validity as a model of cognitive development. His ‘stage’ structure has come under particular criticism (Flavell, 1963 and Cohen, 1983), as have most of the experimental scenarios with his children upon which he formulated his conclusions (Donaldson, 1978 and Cohen, 1983).
Data emerging from subsequent research suggest that Piaget significantly underestimated the abilities of young children, and often overestimated the abilities of teenagers. The principal criticism is not so much that growing children do not pass through developmental hierarchies of object permanence, egocentricity, conservation, class relationship, etc., but that they pass through them rather differently, and at different levels of experience to those which Piaget suggests. One of Piaget’s main contentions was that children learn predominantly through the manipulation of their bodies and objects in the environment. Thought, logical thought, was the pre-eminent product, and was the determining factor in emotional and social experience (Cowan 1978). A child could only feel those feelings and engage in those relationships that his cognitive skills determined. Subsequent research suggests otherwise:
▪ The work of Zajonc et al (1989) suggests that cognitive appraisal need not necessarily feature at all in emotion at its most elemental level.
▪Bryant & Trabasso (1972) demonstrated logical ability in children at a much earlier stage than Piaget allowed.
▪Harris (1975) found that children could handle concepts earlier than Piaget ruled.
▪Maratsos, 1976, Lloyd, 1975 and Hughes, 1975 conducted experiments which demonstrated that young children are, under certain circumstances, able to appreciate the point of view of another, and not as egocentric as Piaget would suggest.
▪ The work of Wolff (1963) and Carpenter (1974) also challenged this contention, finding evidence of appreciation of the human face even in very young babies. Rosenthal (1982) suggested that some social interaction is evident at 3 days.
There are many other studies. Indeed, the 1970s seems to be a decade dedicated to the rejection of as many of Piaget’s claims as possible. What is particularly interesting, however, is that none of these studies invalidates Piaget’s theory, nor refutes his claims out of hand. What they do achieve, in pointing up his omissions, is a highlighting of matters of critical importance to those concerned with child development. For example, information must make sense to a child, and be culturally appropriate, for him to be able to mobilise appropriately those skills at his disposal. The way a situation is described and materials presented, has a considerable impact upon a child’s comprehension of a task. Thus, social setting (the people involved in a situation) also has a bearing on the ability to accomplish tasks. Training is important; a child’s familiarity with materials and procedures will maximise the demonstration of his abilities.