Introduction
When the word ethics is mentioned, often the first reaction is to assume that what follows is a ‘right’ and a ‘wrong’ way of doing things. This is not necessarily the case. The determination of what is ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ is more complex, relying on situational factors that are often unique. Sports coaching is characterised by such situationally unique factors with environmental and performer variables contributing to performance outcomes and processes that are often unpredictable. The role and function of the coach is to bring to bear upon these factors a degree of judgement about correct or ‘right’ actions. These judgements contribute to a nuanced practice environment within which coaches are increasingly judged on performers’ successes and failures (and especially so against a backdrop of funding for sport that is primarily based on medal success). Coaches may have to make decisions about and within their practice against the backdrop of sets of conditions that may challenge their values and their decision making. Moral or ethical decision making has the potential to isolate coaches when they are presented with practice dilemmas that question the basis of their attitudes, values and beliefs, especially when confronted with others whose views may be different. These dilemmas challenge not just what the coach decides is appropriate, but also how they go about coaching their performers, particularly in terms of interpersonal relationships.
However, as our understanding of coaching practice has evolved, key principles underpinning the practice of coaching and the behaviour of coaches have evolved in parallel. As coaching in the United Kingdom moves towards a more ‘professionalised’ approach, more widespread and more accountable educational structures and systems have also emerged. Improved guidance, resources, and principles of good practice have also evolved to support coaching practice. Ethics of practice, however, appear to become relatively taken-for-granted; something that coaches are assumed to understand and grasp intuitively. In the event of a dilemma or the need for guidance, codes of ethics, conduct and practice are relied upon with the questionable assumption that the implementation of these codes will create morally sound coaches. The essence of applying ethics to practice goes beyond codes, and coach education courses are now placing increasing emphasis on coaches becoming aware of and understanding the implications of their ‘duty of care’ and the nature of the trust and power relationship between the performer and the coach. The advent of screening and checking the suitability of coaches to work with children and young people in the UK and elsewhere has acted as a catalyst for thinking about the personal qualities deemed desirable in those coaching sports performers. However, we might reasonably expect that this debate will go beyond dealing with young performers to encompass all coaching domains and the broader moral compass that this implies. In this respect performer welfare is one area of growing interest and awareness within coaching (see Brackenridge et al 2007).
It is a reasonable expectation that the occupation of coaching should be underpinned with an understanding of an ethical base for practice. This is at least in part to gain a foothold on what is seen as an integral part of any profession, namely, a set of ethical or guiding principles. Formalised in various forms of codes, it is through these codes that professions are seen to be accountable for the practice of those who claim to belong to such a profession. Accountability is also the means through which professions gain a form of acceptability as a profession (McNamee 1998). For example, being able to justify player selections, being able to articulate an understanding of the need to realign practice with the needs of coaching children or performers with a disability, or indeed being able to justify the way coaches speak and interact with others as good self-reflective practitioners are examples of relevant ethical contexts. Each of these contributes to a client or participant focus that ought to be embraced by coaches, and codes play a part in aligning practice so that the performer is at the centre (or heart) of this process; in essence, emphasising the principle of ‘performer-centred – coach-led’.
Codes therefore have a role to play in establishing good practice and usually encompass broad guiding principles enshrined within Professional Codes of Practice (sometimes also variously known as Codes of Conduct or Codes of Ethics depending on their use and function). These codes are supported by National Occupational Standards for Coaching, Teaching and Instruction (NOS for CTI). Additionally, the law often determines how our practice must fit within broader societal expectations. Examples of this are the recent changes to the law in the UK regarding working with children and young people (see The Children Act 2004 and the Safeguarding Vulnerable Persons Act 2006). Similar legal minimum standards and expectations in relation to equity are also defined for those working with individuals who have a disability as well as in relation to race and ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation.
These measures however are poor substitutes for individual probity and the objective of this chapter is to outline basic and current principles of practice ethics, as well as exploring areas where coaching is still less than robust in its acceptance and application of ethical practice. This is evident in the power position of the coach in relation to their duty of care and trust, responsibility, working with performers at the ‘stage of imminent achievement’ and being able to support and evidence practice. Evidence-based practice is a key element of ‘practice ethics’ and allows coaches to identify, apply and demonstrate good practice. The principles outlined throughout the chapter reflect current thinking in relation to good coaching practice and should inform and underpin the day-to-day work of coaches.
The chapter concludes with an exploration of the function and expectations inherent within ‘codes’, adopting the position that they should be interpreted as sets of guidance rather than ‘rules’. It will be argued that coaches ought to have a robust sense of the ethical underpinning of the process and outcomes of their coaching in order to be able to interpret the guidance offered and to function autonomously as ethical practitioners. This will also enable them to audit and be accountable for their own behaviour and practice (see McNamee 1998).
Setting the scene: ethics, sport and coaching
There is no doubting the interplay of ethics, sport and coaching. Lyle (1999) in his review of the coaching process makes a strong claim for a humanistic approach to coaching. In his later work he illustrated the ways in which ethics impacts across a range of sporting contexts and can challenge such a humanistic approach (Lyle 2002). Coaches often work across the performance spectrum being responsible for beginners as well as more established performers. This demands a level of sophistication in the coach’s capacity to apply good practice principles across what is an increasingly demanding range of performance levels and stages. What may be deemed acceptable as a way of conducting practice at one level may not be as appropriate at another. Identifying appropriate ethical decisions and behaviours at each stage of the performance spectrum can be problematic, both for the individual practitioner and also for the coaching profession. The implication is that coaching practice, in relation to ethical judgement, is complex, situationally dependent, and offers a dynamic set of practice catalysts. In such a context, it is reasonable to question whether common principles can be identified and applied effectively.
Nevertheless, what underpins ethical behaviour, and our sense of what it is, are links to moral values. Russell (2007) argues that the distinctiveness of the moral values of sport is not easily distinguishable from those of society at large. He argues that while sport may be able to contribute uniquely to the promotion of these values, it still has a commitment to human dignity and needs to be rooted in integrity. Moral values are of course notoriously slippery concepts to articulate with any degree of certainty. The way in which moral values (or ideals) form the basis of our ethical framework in practice is constantly subjected to moral evaluations often variously applied depending on the varying situations in which we find ourselves. Societal norms impact upon our personal attitudes, beliefs and values (and these are not always interchangeable) and shape our views, behaviours and practice as coaches. In a sense, it is inescapable that our values and attitudes are shaped and influenced by the expectations of our wider society. This of course may not always be for the good of sport, our performers or ourselves as coaches, as it assumes that those from outside the community of sport understand and subscribe to what sport means to those involved in it. This is not intentionally to mythologise sport but merely to highlight that there may be competing or uninformed values at play.
Sport generally benefits from being considered ‘a good thing’. It might therefore follow that the process and outcomes of sport involvement are generally beneficial for those involved. To be a sports performer, coach or volunteer may be seen as possessing some virtuous quality, or at least benefiting from the moral qualities that sport is assumed to possess. Rules are formulated to enable those involved in sport to share an understanding of engagement as well as to protect this mythical quality of the ‘good’ of sport. McFee’s (2004) work expands further on this relationship between the values of sport and the necessity and nature of rules.
The assumptions inherent in the view that sport is ‘a good thing’ and that it therefore follows that those involved in sport are ‘good’ is contested ground. Dealing with performers who are on the whole young and impressionable and led by coaches whose education and training may be limited to a mere handful of hours over a few weekends demonstrates a clear need for greater investment in the way in which sport seeks to develop expertise in their coaches. Expertise takes time to develop and there is certainly an argument that novice coaches should be made more aware of the limitations of coaching individuals or teams armed only with the most basic coaching level award. Although governing bodies of sport generally try to emphasise that an early coaching role should be that of supporting more qualified coaches, this is poorly regulated.
Ethical debate in and around sport has tended to focus on crisis events and rule violations such as the use of ergogenic aids, violence and various forms of deception. There has been little attention to the more all-embracing practice of coaching. Since coaching practice is ‘contoured’, fluid and dynamic and rarely completely predictable, this presents the coach with ever-changing circumstances and problems, thus contributing to the notion of the ‘craft’ of coaching (Knowles et al 2006). This notion of coaching as having ‘craft’ qualities is only now beginning to receive attention and builds on the work of, for example, Abrahams and Collins (1998). Practice ethics, as an essential part of the skill set of sports coaches, is still however, a generally neglected area in the development of this ‘craft’. This perhaps indicates a relatively underdeveloped awareness, or understanding, of duties associated with professional practice. One explanation is that coaches already possess a well-rehearsed sense of ethical behaviour, and this need not therefore warrant significant attention in coach education. This is a mistake, as coaches should not operate to a default setting of only being able to articulate a sense of their practice as ethical when things go wrong. It is essential for professional development that coaches are able to articulate a sense of what constitutes ethical practice and what it means for their own coaching principles and practice. It is important to note here that words such as duty and obligations are central to an understanding of ethical practice. These are too often relegated to a brief consideration within Codes of Conduct.
In setting the scene, perhaps nothing more acutely focuses the attention of coaches than the balance between the need to achieve outcomes (e.g. winning), and the means by which coaches work with performers to achieve this. The dilemmas inherent in this simple equation bring into sharp relief the nature of coaching practice across the performance spectrum. The outcome orientation of performance sport, felt most intensely at international or professional levels, contrasts with the use of sport for various social agendas, for example, combating obesity and engaging young people in developing physically active lifestyles. For many coaches the reality of their coaching experience embraces this continuum.
The demands and expectations at the various stages of performer development present coaches with practice dilemmas, not only in terms of the appropriateness of progression strategies, skill selection and the choice of appropriate methodologies of practice and team selection, but also in relation to consideration of the nature of any authority exercised, the nature of the power relationship and the boundaries that are consistent with the exercise of such power and the position of trust. This is seldom addressed in depth within coach education programmes but is exemplified in how coaches are recognised as good practitioners. The balance between rewarding process as opposed to outcomes could usefully be given more considered attention by the coaching community.
What are ethics and what are they not?
At this point it is relevant to consider what we mean by ethics. Ethics should not be interpreted as a restriction. Rather they should be viewed as the manner in which coaches, as practitioners, exercise their own morality. To act ethically is to be considerate of the interests of others. Ethics are also about the interests or the rights of others and indeed, are at the heart of questions relating to practice dilemmas and decision alternatives that invite coaches to ask, ‘what should I do?’ In essence they constitute our set of personal laws, especially in relation to context-specific behaviours. These are not necessarily independent of what is rightfully expected of a practitioner since there should be consonance between what sport and society expects of us and our personal actions. However, they do allow for practitioners to be reactive to particular situations.
Our ethical behaviour is determined by what we as practitioners do rather than what others may do or indeed impose upon us. Ethics therefore are a set of duties we impose upon ourselves as practitioners while taking account of what sport and society expects of us. This might conjure up the notion that there are a variety of appropriate responses to ethical dilemmas. While this might be the case, ethical decisions are nevertheless subject to some universal understanding and agreement. For example, sport has defined appropriate conduct by coaches as requiring them to be subject to a principle that demands that they do not covertly or overtly administer banned substances to their performers, or that they do not use physical chastisement as a means of coercion within their practice. This is based upon what individuals within sport and indeed society expect of sport. Therefore, ethical practice is about making moral decisions based upon a majority consensus on universal principles.
A key consideration within this exercise of moral judgement is the notion that those that we coach, instruct or lead are often considered by the nature of the coaching environment to be ‘situationally vulnerable’. This means that the coach is in a position of trust and that trust can, if developed without check, create an unwitting power imbalance. This can lead to a negative coaching environment, potential dependency and indeed in extreme cases, an abusive relationship (see Brackenridge 2001). This trust extends beyond the mere ability to ensure that coaches select the appropriate number of sets, repetitions and intensities, but also to the way in which they are able to interact with their performers and use their power position for the good of the performer. This notion of client service or good will be discussed later.
In performance sport, coaches are most often evaluated by the performance outcomes of their athletes. For some this offers a number of opportunities to ‘take short cuts’. These actions create moral dilemmas and inevitably, in such circumstances, we generate self-justificatory arguments to defend our behaviour. An understanding of, and reflection on, professional ethics allows us to consider this rationale for behaviour in the context of key principles and processes, although this may not reflect ‘firm ground’. Jones and McNamee (2003, p 42) recognise that ‘sport is a complex cultural practice that is neither entirely synonymous with the rest of society nor separate from it.’ It is within this contested ground that coaches operate. Thus the ability to differentiate between options as moral agents is important in being able to act as client-centred professionals. What is required of practitioners is judgement. The knowledge of what moral rules are and the principles on which they are founded help practitioners make better judgements.
At this point it will be useful to consider the nature of ethical decision-making that guides practice ethics in most professions. Although there is no one particular process for arriving at a morally ‘right’ position or decision, there are key theories that help us formulate our arguments. Most of these will be familiar, with the key tenet of ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ the most obvious. This tendentious and often elusive ambition is frequently a tipping point between good and poor practice. However, it forms only part of our moral reasoning. These moral guides or markers are important in arriving at a shared understanding of what our practice should look like both to ourselves and to those that we coach. Shields and Bredemeier (1995) suggest that for the purposes of making a decision about moral actions there is a staged process:
1. Interpreting of moral cues – what is the significance of this event?
2. Exercising judgement – this might depend on the moral maturity of the individual involved (and supports the case that ethics and ethical behaviour need to be given increased emphasis in the education and training of coaches).
3. Selecting a course of action (value choice) – based on what is perceived to be the most appropriate course of action, depending on the context of the moral judgement and individual choice.
4. Implementing action – to act in a manner that underpins the judgement made.
However, the relationship between what coaches do and how they should do it as part of critical self-analysis of whether it is a ‘good’ action is seldom considered. It is important to be able to distinguish between ‘good’ (for the client) and ‘good’ (as in virtuous). This distinction is at the centre of how we make ethical decisions as coaches. What sometimes helps practitioners in the interpretation of these principles, and the construction of actions, are action principles. Kant’s ‘categorical imperatives’ form part of the most widely known, accepted and understood set of underpinning rationales in ethical theory. There are three key imperatives and simply interpreted, they are expressed as follows.
1. Laws should be universal. That is to say, an action is good only if the principle of it can be applied in practice to everyone. Therefore to act in a moral manner is based on the understanding that everyone might act similarly.
2. You should consider yourself as subject to any act. In other words you should only do to others what you would do to yourself.
3. Never treat others as a means to an end (see Hursthouse 2001 for a good summary).
Although the key tenets of Kant’s categorical imperatives are laid out somewhat simplistically above, they are nevertheless recognisable as guiding principles. The underlying premise of Kant’s rules is that they provide overarching guidance based on moral principles that apply to all contexts and to all persons. From this perspective, actions are based on rules, duties and obligations as we navigate our way through the complexities of professional practice. Thus, particular actions are good or bad, and there is little leeway in this. For example, intrinsically good acts in coaching practice might be always telling the truth and always keeping promises (such as in selection) irrespective of the situation. Intrinsically bad acts might be inflicting physical or emotional harm or deliberately and wilfully breaking rules (such as the administration of banned substances).
There are other competing principles however, since this is contested ground. The notion that Kant’s principles can be universally applied in all situations is somewhat simplistic. For example, Brown (2003) argues that moral considerations arise out of moral obligations, which in turn arise out of conflicts. These conflicts are the product of what we might call our personal inclinations on the one hand and our duties on the other. It is our ability to act as a moral agent in distinguishing between the two that will determine our effectiveness in dealing with situations involving those that we are entrusted to coach or lead. Indeed, as the choices inherent within coaching practice come under increasing scrutiny, sport practitioners must confront the consequences of their decisions, and be comfortable in opening their practice to such scrutiny. This scrutiny may suggest to the coach that some aspect of the situation has been ignored or not recognised, or that alternative courses of action were possible. This sort of reflection may also highlight any conflict between our personal or core values and the action that seems appropriate.