All coaches will have developed a personal set of views on coaching, interpersonal relationships, and on issues relevant to their sport. These views will have evolved over time and will be derived from a range of practical and educational experiences. What coaches do in their practice and how they do it will be shaped by these views (Cushion, 2006 and Cassidy et al., 2009). Importantly, these views or personal principles and values are attributes that comprise a coaching philosophy (Cassidy et al 2009). It is widely accepted that the articulation of a coaching philosophy is a means to understanding and developing coaching practice, and this ‘reflective’ exercise is part of most coach development programmes (Cassidy et al 2009). However, there remains a lack of engagement with this process, and this in part is due to what Cassidy et al (2009 p 56) describe as ‘superficial and simplistic assumptions about the value of establishing and locating definitive philosophies’. This situation is aggravated by a lack of detailed research on coaching philosophy.

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the concept of a coaching philosophy, to review critically the literature in the field, and to make suggestions as to how research and scholarship on coaching philosophy might proceed. Definitions of coaching philosophy are presented from noteworthy texts, such as Lyle (2002), before Milton Rokeach’s work on human values is proposed as a framework for clarifying our understanding of beliefs, values and principles. Attention is given to Cassidy et al’s (2009) review from a socio-cultural and pedagogical perspective, which draws particularly from Lyle’s (1999) seminal work; while recent studies by Schempp et al., 2006, Nash et al., 2008 and Denison, 2007 are also considered.

In considering future research directions, there are three sections: storytelling, development of coaching philosophy, and coaching philosophy versus coaching behaviour. In the storytelling section, the role of values and storytelling in Kouzes and Posner’s (2002) theory is presented, with discussion of points raised about critical incidents and storytelling with reference to Tripp, 1993 and Gardner, 1995 respectively. The section on the development of coaching philosophy begins by addressing Walton’s (1992) notion of the ‘great philosopher coach’, and then critically examines the development of a coaching philosophy over time. Using the former UCLA basketball coach John Wooden as an exemplar, Martens’ (2004) notion that coaches do not begin their careers with the same philosophy that is championed at the end of their careers is examined. The question of how long it takes to develop a coaching philosophy, the influence of background and education, and the issue of self-awareness are also discussed.

In the final section, the attention is on youth sport and a summary is provided of important work associated with the American Sport Education Program, the National Standards for Sports Coaching, and the Positive Coaching Alliance. There is a discussion of the research of McAllister et al (2000), which shows constraints on coaching philosophy, and should be a spur to further research examining inconsistencies between stated coaching philosophy and coaching practice/behaviour.

Definitions of coaching philosophy typically make reference to one or more of the following: beliefs, values and principles. The following example makes reference to all three:

Coaching philosophy is viewed by Lyle (1999) in terms of not only beliefs and values, but also behaviours:

Lyle (1999) is particularly concerned with ‘the issue of a potential conflict between stated beliefs, actual practice, and personal values’ (p 30). He argues that coaching philosophy should be thought of in terms of ‘principles’ that guide coaching practice, usually expressed as a list of statements about various aspects of the coach’s practice: ‘each statement will contain a declaration of belief about an aspect of the individual’s practice and an indication of the practical manifestation of this belief (p 31, emphasis added). From Lyle’s experience in coach education, the ‘practical manifestation’ of the beliefs is not always present and the circumstances in which values will be evident are often not specified (Lyle 1999 p 31–32).

In a subsequent text, Lyle (2002) emphasises values in his discussion of coaching philosophy and states that values underlie opinions and beliefs. He is still interested in the dissociation between a coach’s stated philosophy and his or her actual coaching practice, but defined coaching philosophy in terms of a ‘set of values or values framework’ (p 165) even though a coaching philosophy is ‘generally not expressed in the vocabulary of values themselves’ but rather ‘couched in terms of principles related to behaviour’: ‘taken as a whole, a coaching philosophy should provide a set of guiding principles for coaching practice, and … identify those values that are felt most strongly’ (p 166, emphasis added).

Lyle (2002) draws attention to the fact that there may be dissociations between a coach’s personal values and his or her publicly stated values; and between organisational values and coaching values. In their review, Cassidy et al (2009) elaborate on these dissociations to make the point that coaching philosophies are often compromised by constraints such as the desire to meet the needs of the employing organisation (p 56–57).

In developing the constructs of beliefs, values and principles more fully, Milton Rokeach in his influential work on human values distinguishes three types of belief: descriptive or existential (i.e. capable of being true or false); evaluative (i.e. judged to be good or bad); and prescriptive or proscriptive (i.e. some means or end of action is judged to be desirable or undesirable) (Rokeach 1973 p 6–7). Values are prescriptive or proscriptive beliefs. Rokeach (1973) makes the following assumptions about the nature of values:

Rokeach defines a value as ‘an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence’ (p. 5) and a value system as ‘an enduring organization of beliefs concerning preferable modes of conduct or end-states of existence along a continuum of relative importance’ (p 5).

Values that refer to a mode of conduct and an end-state are termed by Rokeach instrumental and terminal values, respectively. Examples of instrumental values from Rokeach’s (1973) study of values found in American society are ambitious (hard-working, aspiring), courageous (standing up for your beliefs), honest (sincere, truthful) and responsible (dependable, reliable); examples of terminal values are freedom (independence, free choice), happiness (contentedness), self-respect (self-esteem) and social recognition (respect, admiration). Values can be further understood in relation to, and differentiated from, attitudes and norms (Rokeach 1973 p 18). Values are determinants of attitudes and are far fewer in number than attitudes (dozens rather than thousands). Unlike attitudes, values are standards that transcend a specific object or situation. A value is based on a single belief, whereas an attitude refers to several beliefs.

A value may refer to a mode of behaviour or end-state of existence, but a norm refers only to a mode of behaviour. Unlike a value, a norm refers to behaviour in a specific situation and is consensual and external to the person. Values can also be differentiated from principles, which are concerned with implementation of values; i.e. they are guidelines for putting values into practice.

To conclude this section: Lyle (2002) indicates that a coaching philosophy should be couched in terms of values and principles. The work of Rokeach (1973) provides a useful framework that clarifies the relationship between beliefs, values, attitudes and norms. The use of such a framework could be used in framing future studies into coach philosophy. In addition, Rokeach’s work offers an analytical or thinking tool that could have practical use for coaches making explicit their coaching philosophies.

Compared to topics such as coaching behaviours, there has been a dearth of research on coaching philosophy (Cushion, 2006 and Cassidy et al., 2009). This is perhaps surprising in light of the importance that understanding a coach’s philosophy has on understanding that coach’s practice, and given the emphasis that authors of textbooks on coaching have given to coaching philosophy (e.g. Martens 2005 p 4, Vealey 2005 p 21). Indeed, these authors emphasise the pre-eminence of coaching philosophy in informing coaches especially when they are required to make difficult decisions. Much of the research directed at coaching philosophy is anecdotal and found in the numerous books by or about high-profile coaches (e.g. Reynaud 2006), especially in the major American sports, or based on interviews (e.g. Jones et al., 2004 and Voight and Carroll, 2006), again with high-profile coaches.

Cassidy et al (2009) have recently considered coaching philosophy and reviewed the literature from a socio-cultural and pedagogical perspective. Drawing particularly on the work of Lyle, 1999 and Lyle, 2002, these authors argued that coaching philosophies should be regarded as ‘flexible guides to action’ (p 64), which are based on personal values but account for ‘contextual complexity’ (p 64) in that they are ‘able to adapt to changing circumstances’ (p 61). These authors draw on the work of Bourdieu (1977) to argue that coaching can be viewed as ‘regulated improvisation’. While a critical discussion of Bourdieu’s work and its application to coaching is called for, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. However, the reader is referred to Cushion (2007a, 2007b) as a starting point for exploring the concepts of ‘habitus’ and ‘logic of practice’ in Bourdieu’s work. Cassidy et al draw on the useful distinction made by Raffel (1998) between ‘principled’ and ‘rule-guided’ behaviour. The former refers to practice based on values, while the latter involves a prescriptive approach. The distinction can be summed up with the expression that ‘rules are followed by fools but are for the guidance of wise men’.

There has been a distinct lack of studies that examine coaches’ personal philosophies in the peer-reviewed literature. Two recent exceptions are Schempp et al., 2006 and Nash et al., 2008. Schempp et al (2006) found that philosophy (defined as things teachers believe) was one of five themes that emerged from analysis of data collected from 31 coaches listed by Golf Magazine’s ‘Top 100 Golf Instructors in America’ as representing the activities and qualities they most often monitored. By self-monitoring is meant ‘the reflective practice of tracking and recording one’s own performance’ (p 26). Within the philosophy theme were four categories centred around beliefs. These were: beliefs about learner needs and characteristics; beliefs about what to teach; beliefs about the purpose and ways of teaching; and beliefs about the structure of teaching (p 32). Schempp et al found that with these coaches there was limited self-monitoring of their philosophy relative to other themes (i.e. skills, knowledge and personal characteristics). This finding was accounted for by the fact that the coaches in their study had on average 17 years of experience, thus it would not be unreasonable to assume perhaps that their beliefs would be relatively stable.

In a study based on semi-structured interviews with 21 coaches of different levels in Scotland, Nash et al (2008) concluded that as coaches gain knowledge and become more experienced, they are able both to articulate a coherent personal philosophy and to contextualise it in their coaching practice. Coaches at the beginning levels of coach education, i.e. Levels 1 and 2, ‘generally did not exhibit an obvious awareness of their core values and coaching methods’; whereas more experienced coaches at Level 3 ‘showed evidence of a more profound consideration of their coaching philosophy and of the recognition the direct impact a coaching philosophy has on their coaching processes and strategies’ (p 551). Advanced coaches at Levels 4 and 5, however, ‘demonstrated a conceptual awareness of key ideas related both to sport and coaching, as well as appreciation of the social, cultural and political values associated with the practice of coaching’ (p 551). Notwithstanding the small sample size, there appeared to be a relationship between not only years of coaching experience but also educational achievements. For example, none of the Level 1 coaches had progressed beyond a high-school education; while all the Level 4 and 5 coaches held university degrees. The type of study carried out by Nash et al (2008) could be enhanced by researchers taking a sociological perspective such as used by Green (2000) in his study of PE teachers’ ‘everyday philosophies’.

A good example of a study on coaching philosophy from a sociological perspective is Denison’s (2007) autobiographical account of his coaching of a male cross-country runner called ‘Brian’. In this study Denison presents an alternative analysis to his initial ‘psychological’ interpretation for Brian’s poor performance in a race by utilising Michel Foucault’s social theory. Denison argues that Foucault’s (1979) theory of disciplinary power provides ‘a worthwhile heuristic for coaches to evaluate and enhance their athletes’ performance’, that is, a theory that can inform a coach’s personal philosophy.